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I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of "war" has undergone extensive usage in U.S. foreign
policy since the terrorist attacks of September 11,2001. Not allowing itself to
be confined by formal declarations, finite military objectives, and other
characteristics of traditional warfare, the U.S. government has adopted a broad
usage of the word "war" to define its counterterrorism measures. Indeed, the
"war on terrorism" has revived attempts to redefine "war" along with the legal
implications that are associated with various forms of armed conflict.'
The politically fluid understanding of "war" has practical concerns for
international legal norms, not least because of the high stature counterterrorism
has been placed in U.S. foreign policy concerns.2 Not only can the legal
ambiguity of "war on terrorism" be expected to continue to influence the
American approach to armed conflicts in the form of non-normative policies,3
but economic measures may also take hitherto unconventional forms to
counteract terrorist funding.4 Because restrictive trade regulations, particularly
sanctions, are a common method of employing economic measures against
perceived antagonistic foreign interests, it may be of practical value to examine
the legality and feasibility of alternative possibilities to traditional trade
sanctions for national security objectives.
Before speculating on the possible merits and shortcomings of a new
approach to national security trade sanctions, however, it is necessary to
analyze the legal background and practice of conventional sanctions. Thus, the
first section of this Paper seeks to explore the effect of trade sanctions in
1. Nathaniel Berman, Privileging Combat? Contemporary Conflict and the Legal Construction
of War, 43 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 7 (2004). To highlight the legal implications of approaching
counterterrorism as a "war," the French government, in contrast, has adopted a criminal law approach, see
Michael Steinberger, The War on Terror's Legal Challenges, FIN. TIMES (Asia ed.), Jan. 8-9, 2005, at
Weekend 3. It should be noted, however, that the "war on terrorism" has also been dismissed as mere rhetoric
rather than an actual paradigm shift in law, see Yoram Dinstein, The Rule of Law in Conflict and Post-
Conflict Situations: Comment on War, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 877 (2004); Moreover, the formal
concept of"war" itself has undergone change since the end of World War II; see BRIAN HALLETT, THE LOST
ART OF DECLARING WAR (1998).
2. Counterterrorism, including a "war" against terrorists, has taken a primary place in U.S. foreign
policy; see THE WHITE HOUSE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2002) [hereinafter NSS], available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2006).
3. The U.S. use ofpreemptive self-defense as justification for the invasion oflraq in 2003 has been
criticized as a violation of international norms. E.g., Thomas M. Franck, What Happens Now? The United
Nations after Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 607, 610-14 (2003); John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729,
797 (2004); contra William H. Taft IV &Todd F. Buchwald, Agora: Future Implication of the Iraq Conflict:
Preemption, Iraq, and International Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 557 (2003).
4. The NSS presents the importance of disruption of terrorist funding as a critical step in
counterterrorism measures. NSS, supra note 2.
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today's fight against modem international terrorism, and specifically to explore
the structural inadequacies of utilizing conventional trade sanctions as weapons
against the evolving forms of terrorism. Due to the breadth of the subject,
though, this Paper limits itself to national security sanctions as specifically
permitted by Article XXI in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).' Article XXI provides that:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed:
a. to require any contracting party to furnish any information the
disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential security
interests; or
b. to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which
it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security
interests
i. relating to fissionable materials or the chemicals from
which they are derived;
ii. relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements
of war and to such traffic in other goods and materials as
is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of
supplying a military establishment;
iii. taken in time of war or other emergency in international
relations; or
c. to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in
pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter
for the maintenance of international peace and security.6
Currently, Article XXI sanctions are placed on national political units, but
with terrorists increasingly shedding national identities, the traditional rationale
of using sanctions, either to punish nation states for supporting terrorism or to
coerce nation states into relinquishing ties to international terrorism, has
become outdated. This Paper will examine the history of GATT Article XXI,
starting with the drafting history of the Article as well as early usage of the
security exception. A historical look at Article XXI and at the GATT ought to
provide valuable clues as to the original intent of the security exception as well
as the formative practices of the exception, which can be compared and
contrasted with later trade rules.
5. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-1l , 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATI] (incorporating into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Annex IA of the
WTO Agreement at 1 (a)).
6. GATT, supra note 5 at art. 2 1.
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The Paper will then turn to the intention behind the creation of the World
Trade Organization (WTO),7 the historic revolution in international trade
disputes. The application of Article XXI, naturally, changed in light of the new
system. Since the WTO is the present framework from which to understand
security-related trade sanctions, an examination of WTO disputes reveals the
possible legal limits of Article XXI. Furthermore, this Paper will look at how
sanctions are applied today. Today's sanctions against nation states continue
the traditional view of state-to-state foreign engagement, which can in part be
explained by diplomatic symbolism and institutional inertia bound up in the
history of GATT and the WTO. In spite of the history, tradition, and institu-
tional structures, the present day practice of whole-state sanctions may need to
be reexamined in light of the growing terrorism from non-state actors.
Terrorism has changed in character and its sources of funding have altered, too.
Such realities may encourage the possibility of finding new uses and limits to
Article XXI.
In the second section of this Paper an alternative method of applying
sanctions is offered, a method that attempts to address the shortcomings of
present sanctions while retaining the forcefulness that makes sanctions a
practical weapon in international disputes. Regional sanctions that pay little
heed to national borders, but rather focus on specific areas or regions are
offered as a practical alternative solution. Possible objections to regional
sanctions are presented, as well, at the end of the Paper.
H. SANCTIONS PAST AND PRESENT
A. Background to GATTArticle XXI
1. Drafting of Article XXI
The Allied powers at the end of the Second World War viewed growth in
international commerce and economic prosperity as vehicles for a lasting peace.
So when Allied victory in World War II seemed imminent, the Allies convened
in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire and laid out the three pivotal institutions of
modem trade liberalization designed to ensure world peace: the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the GATT.8 The GATT became the
7. World Trade Organization, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
April 15, 1994 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
8. Jim Chen, Pax Mercatoria: Globalization as a Second Chance at "Peace for Our Time ", 24
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 217, 226 (2000).
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primary global framework for which to assess trade liberalization, and thus the
provisions of GATT took on a significance of their own.9
Article XXI is an original provision of the 1947 GATT that was drafted
with much debate and conflicting ideas.'0 The drafters struggled with finding
a balance between two important interests: the right of states to freely protect
themselves from security threats and the need to limit the use of a security
exception to only in times of genuine security threats, which one drafter to the
original GATT noted, "[w]e cannot make it too light, because we cannot
prohibit measures which are needed purely for security reasons. On the other
hand, we cannot make it so broad that, under the guise of security, countries
will put on measures which really have a commercial purpose.""
The security exception had to be addressed far more carefully than other
issues for trade exceptions, such as protection of public morals, protection of
human, animal, or plant life or health, and preservation of national treasures,12
because "[n]ational security issues are obviously very sensitive and intimately
connected with the safety, sovereignty and existence of States." 3 The fact that
the GATT drafters understood this is illustrated by their revision of Article XXI
from the original intention of using the more restrictive chapeau of Article XX 4
for both Article XX and Article XXI. 5 Thus, the drafting history indicates that
the application of the Article XXI security exception was not meant to be
judged with the same level of scrutiny as other exceptions in the GATT
framework, but at the very strictest, a scrutiny that gives more deference to the
states applying the security exception than would normally be given for other
GATT exceptions.
9. For a history on the GATT, see JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (MIT Press,
1989); JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969).
10. See Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Creating Standards and Accountability for the Use of the WTO
Security Exception: Reducing the Role of the Power-Based Relations and Establishing a New Balance
Between Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 413, 421-22 (2001).
11. Preparatory Committee of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, July 24, 1947,
Verbatim Report, at 20-21, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/A/PV/33 (1947).
12. This is a partial list of "General Exceptions" found in GAIT. GAIT, supra note 5, at art. 20.
13. Dapo Akande & Sope Williams, InternationalAdjudication on National Security Issues: What
Role for the WTO?, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 365, 372 (2003).
14. The chapeau of Article XX states: "Subject to the requirement that such measures are not
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures
.Cf. GAIT, supra note 5, at art. 21 (qualifying terms such as "arbitrary" and "unjustifiable
discrimination" are not explicitly mentioned in Article XXI).
15. Cann, supra note 10, at 422.
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2. Past Usage of Article XXI
Usage of Article XXI under the pre-WTO GATT framework gave rise to
the unresolved question of whether or not GATT Contracting Parties had a right
to invoke Article XXI without subject to any review by some sort of judicial
panel.' 6 This was complicated by the language of Article XXI, which seems to
give more deference to invoking States than other GATT exceptions. This
deferential feature of the Article's wording coupled with the fact that before the
establishment of the WTO, GATT existed as an ad hoc unofficial "institution"
composed of agreements with no permanent or central organization,
7
significantly reduced the odds of probability that usage of Article XXI would
ever be subject to outside review.
The first attempted usage of Article XXI as a justification for a sanction
was by the United States against Czechoslovakia. 8 Czechoslovakia brought
attention to the U.S. sanction in 1949, claiming that the United States invoked
Article XXI in an overly broad way, "because the narrow reference in the text
to war materials had been construed by the United States Government to cover
a wide range of goods which could never be so regarded."' 9 Paving the way for
outside review on the Article XXI application, the U.S. conceded that "if at any
time it were thought that a decision had been based on false premises, the
interested party could have recourse to the appeal board which was instituted
for that purpose."" Upon review, the Contracting Parties rejected
Czechoslovakia's claim on substantive grounds, but, significantly, the Con-
tracting Parties did not decline jurisdiction over the case.2'
After the U.S.-Czechoslovakia dispute, various nations invoked Article
XXI as a defense for sanctions six more times prior to the establishment of the
16. Peter Lindsay, The Ambiguity of GA 7TArticle XXI: Subtle Success or Rampant Failure?, 52
DUKE L.J. 1277, 1310-11 (2003).
17. GATT became the defacto unofficial organization responsible for overseeing GATT compliance
when the U.S. failed to ratify the proposed International Trade Organization (ITO) as the official organization
empowered to manage trade liberalization. Consequently, GATT operated more on consensus between
Contracting Parties and less on centralized decision-making made by a legally empowered organization. See
JOHN H. JACKSON et al., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 293-301 (3d ed. 1995).
18. Summary Record of the Twenty-Second Meeting, GATIr/CP.3/SR22, B.I.S.D. 128 (June 8,
1949).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Hannes L. Schloemann & Stefan Ohlhoff, Constitutionalization andDispute Settlement in the
WTO: National Security as an Issue of Competence, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 424, 432 (1999). For background
facts on the U.S.-Czechoslovakia dispute, see Antonio F. Perez, WTO and UN. Law: Institutional Comity
in National Security, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 301, 333 (1998).
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WTO.2 2 Of these cases, three set important principles in place for under-
standing the scope of Article XXI. In the 1961 dispute between Ghana and
Portugal, where Ghana defended its sanctions, Ghana expanded the usage of the
national security application by using it to cover potential as well as actual
danger.23  A little over two decades later a dispute erupted between the
European Community (EC) and Argentina, from which the Contracting Parties
adopted the decision that a nation invoking Article XXI had to notify other
Contracting Parties "to the fullest extent possible. 24 In 1985, the United States
invoked Article XXI tojustify its sanctions against Nicaragua at the time.25 The
U.S. did not permit the Contracting Parties to make a substantive review of its
actions, asserting that Article XXI was self-defining for individual States.26
3. Creation of WTO and Its Usage
The WTO was proposed to at least in part help clarify some of the
ambiguity of the former GATT framework. The WTO accomplishes this by
requiring Member Nations to implicitly surrender some sovereignty in order to
join the WTO and take advantage of its benefits.27 Another feature of WTO
that makes it much stronger than its forebear is the mandatory and independent
dispute resolution system.2' The WTO dispute settlement system was actually
urged by the United States, more than any other Uruguay Round participant, so
that a prospective defendant would not experience the same level of frustration
as defendants did under the old GATT system.29
The formation of the WTO has been called a watershed moment in modem
politics and economics in that it has constitutionalized customs of international
trade law and consequently strengthened the role free trade has in international
22. Note, Be Careful What You Wish for: U.S. Politics and the Future of the National Security
Exception to the GA TT, 31 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 97, 101 (1997).
23. See GATT Council, Summary Record of the Twelfth Session, GATr/SR.19/12 [hereinafter
Summary Record] (Dec. 12, 1961).
24. Report ofthe Panel, Decisions Concerning ArticleXXl ofthe General Agreement, l (Nov. 30,
1982), GATT B.I.S.D. (20th Supp.), at 23 (1983).
25. Exec. Order No. 12,513, 3 C.F.R. 342 (1986), reprinted in United States-TRADE MEASURES
AFFECTING NACUARAGUA: COMMUNICATION FROM THE UNITED STATES, GATr/L/5803, at 2 (May 29,
1985).
26. See GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held July 17-19,1985, GATT/C/M/191, at 41 (Sept.
11, 1985).
27. Lindsay, supra note 16, at 1298.
28. Id. at 1303.
29. John H. Jackson, Helm-Burton, the U.S., andthe WTO, ASIL INSIGHTS, March 1997, available
at http://www.asil.org/insights/insight7/htm (last visited Sep. 26, 2006).
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relations.30 Indeed, in just a few years after the establishment of the WTO,
international trade law rapidly has evolved into a stable, mature, and almost
predictable niche within the discipline of law itself. This is largely due to the
massive volume of cases that the WTO dispute settlement system has handled
since 1995; processing over 11,000 pages of reports total.3' It is no wonder
then that the WTO dispute settlement system has become known as "the busiest
international system for resolving international disputes in the history of the
world."32 Even so, an Article XXI case has not been brought to the WTO panel
and decided on yet.
Two significant Article XXI sanctions have been challenged, though, since
the birth of the WTO framework. In the controversy over the Helms-Burton
Act,33 the U.S. went beyond mere trade sanctions against Cuba, but also opened
up American courts to civil lawsuits against any companies from third-party
countries for "trafficking" in Cuban property once owned by Americans.
American plaintiffs can sue for up to three times the value of the property.
Moreover, the Helms-Burton Act prohibits the officers, controlling share-
holders, and even the families of such who were found "trafficking" in formerly
American-owned property from visiting the United States.34 The E.U., Canada,
and Mexico threatened to challenge Helms-Burton in a WTO panel; and the
U.S. defended the legislation on Article XXI grounds, even suggesting that a
WTO panel's jurisdiction would not be recognized.35 In the end, a political
solution was worked out between the United States and the E.U. in order to
avoid a WTO panel ruling.36 Thus, the Helms-Burton controversy may not be
very useful in shedding light on how to interpret Article XXI, but it does
illustrate the reluctance of nations to actually go through with a WTO panel
decision on Article XXI issues. This may largely stem from a desire of States
30. John H. Jackson, Introduction: Reflections on International Economic Law, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L.
L. 17, 23 (1996).
31. James Bacchus, Groping Toward Grotius: The WTO and the International Rule of Law, 44
HARV. INT'L L.J. 533, 540 (2003). A more recent count records that there have been a total of 345 disputes
brought before the WTO. WTO, Chronological List of Disputes Cases, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu_e/dispustatus-e.htm#2005 (last visited Sept. 28, 2006); and of
those, 73 Appellate Body Reports from 1996 to 2005. WTO, Dispute Settlement: Statistics, available at
http'J/www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/stats-e.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2006).
32. Bacchus, supra note 31, at 540.
33. See generally The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996,
22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-91. (1996).
34. Id.
35. Lindsay, supra note 16, at 1305-06.
36. Id. at 1307.
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to maintain control over their own security-influenced trade policy rather than
leaving such decisions up to an international third party.a7
The second significant Article XXI dispute thus far in the WTO era is a
trade conflict between Nicaragua and Colombia.3" Nicaragua imposed
sanctions on Colombia and defended the sanctions by invoking Article XXI and
arguing that a WTO panel does not have jurisdiction over Article XXI
sanctions. The E.U., mindful of Helms-Burton, supported Colombia's right to
appeal to the WTO for a panel review. Eventually, a deal was worked out in
which the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO agreed to set up a panel,
but the Chairman of the DSB consulted with Nicaragua and Colombia, thereby
avoiding the establishment of a panel.39 This dispute also shows reluctance for
rushing an Article XXI dispute to a panel. Consequently, no Article XXI
dispute has been resolved by a WTO panel. This means that the hypothetical
question of whether the panel will adopt absolute deference to the states or
varying degrees short of this continues to divide scholars.40 In a larger sense,
no boundaries yet have been put on Article XXI limiting its usage in any way.
This may be both a curse and a blessing in that states have neither a model nor
guideline to follow when issuing sanctions; yet precisely because of this lack
of clarity, states are free to do as they wish. The current lack of consensus of
Article XXI makes for interesting analysis in light of evolving and growing
national security concerns that haunt the modern geopolitical landscape.
37. Lindsay speculates that States have an incentive of maintaining a blurry concept of Article XXI
so that they may use the provision whenever they feel they need it. For this reason, WTO members are not
"rushing to embrace the new legalism for issues of national-security." Id. at 1308.
38. See WTO, Nicaragua-MeasuresAffectinglmportsfrom Honduras and Colombia, WT/DS 188/2
(Mar. 28, 2000).
39. Akande & Williams, supra note 13, at 377.
40. For a sampling of scholarly opinion, see Antonio F. Perez, To Judge Between the Nations: Post
Cold War Transformations in National Security and Separation of Powers-Beating Nuclear Swords into
Plowshares in an Imperfectly Competitive World, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 331,408-10 (1997)
(presenting the view that because the WTO dispute settlement process intended to be more adjudicative than
the pre-WTO GATT, the WTO ought to have more authority over substantive trade questions, including the
security exception); Rene E. Browne, Revisiting "National Security" in an Interdependent World: The
GATT Article X1I Defense After Helms-Burton, 86 GEO. L.J. 405, 432 (1997), (asserting that national
sovereignty is becoming an outdated concept facing competing values, which means national security
concerns must be subjected to a WTO panel that balances such concerns against the value placed in
interdependent trade); David A. Baldwin, Reconciling Political Sanctions with Globalization and Free
Trade: Prolegomena to Thinking about Economic Sanctions and Free Trade, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 271,280-81
(2003) (giving the perspective that nations ought to have authority to impose security-related trade sanctions
because issues other than trade are involved and the global political stability from sanctions eventually leads
to more free trade); see Lindsay, supra note 16, at 1310 (offers a compromise solution of deliberately leaving
the question of deference unanswered so as to allow and encourage disputing parties to politically negotiate
through the sensitive terrain of national security issues).
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B. Present Sanctions in the War on Terrorism
1. Recent Counterterrorism Actions
One of the most visible national security concerns in recent years is
terrorism. Although difficult to track statistically, not least of all because of a
difficulty in defining the criteria, terrorism arguably reached relative highs in
terms of total number of international terrorist attacks between the years 1999
and 2001.41 Undoubtedly, such numbers have fueled the increased concern
expressed by governments, the media, and the public over terrorism.
The magnitude of the threat from terrorism, indeed, can be anecdotally
measured by the increasing number of counter-terrorism commissions and
official measures being created by primarily economic multi-national
organizations throughout various parts of the world. The Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC), for example, established its Counter Terrorism
Task Force (CTTF) in February 2003, which, among other programs, oversees
the Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR) program. 2 The European Union
adopted the Treaty on European Union in 2002, which includes in the
Provisions on Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters an article
that specifically identifies terrorism as a matter that needs policing.43 In the
aftermath of the March 11, 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid, the E.U. set up a
pan-European anti-terrorism campaign that created uniform arrest warrants and
database entries to track and mitigate potential terrorist threats." In Southeast
Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) adopted the
Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism in November 2001.4
The swelling concern of terrorism by multi-national organizations more
experienced in trade and economic issues is consistent with the increasing
attention that political institutions have given to terrorism issues in recent years.
41. U.S. Dept. of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, Appendix G (released June 22, 2004),
available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2003 (follow "Report (pdf format)" hyperlink; follow "Appendix
G" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 7, 2006).
42. Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, Counter Terrorism (2006), available at
http://www.apecsec.org.sg/apec/apec__groups/somspecial-task_.groups/counter-terrorism.html (last visited
Sept. 26, 2006).
43. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 29 OFFICIAL J. EUR. COMMUNITIES
(2002).
44. Thomas Fuller, European Union Agrees on Plan to Coordinate Anti-terror Effort, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 26, 2004 at A9. For a slightly skeptical perspective, however, on the efficacy of E.U. law enforcement
integration, see Eric J. Lobsinger, Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: A Window on EU Integration, I
HANSE L. REv. 127, 236-41 (2005), available at http://www.hanselawreview.org (follow "Vol.1 No.2"
hyperlink; then follow "Article" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 26, 2006).
45. Ass'n of Southeast AsianNations [ASEAN],ASEANEfforts to Counter Terrorism (Nov. 2001),
available at http://www.aseansec.org/l4396.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2006).
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For instance, the member nations of the regionally based Organization of
American States (OAS) signed the Inter-American Convention Against
Terrorism in June 2002.46 In the weeks following September 11, 2001, the
Security Council of the United Nations adopted Resolution 1373 to condemn
the September 11 th attacks and to establish the Counter Terrorism Committee,
which comprises of all fifteen Security Council members.47 In the U.S.,
President George W. Bush issued sweeping economic sanctions as U.S. policy
in the immediate aftermath of the September 1lth attacks.48  Moreover,
government leaders from diverse nations have convened to discuss how
ideological terrorism threatens to completely replace current notions of
government with systematic governance that imposes the ideology of terrorist
organizations.49 Aside from political reasons, an economic rationale as to why
governments have taken a proactive interest in blotting out terrorism is that
terrorism is seen as a threat to trade liberalization-safe trade is an important
precondition of free trade.5"
The dual phenomena of terrorism and expanding globalized markets have
become linked as a way for the world powers to define global political and
economic policy. The United States has taken up a foreign policy of expanding
free markets and free trade as a tool to counteract the appeal of terrorism in
impoverished parts of the world.5 This policy of using trade as a counter-
terrorism measure under the faith that doing so will reduce poor economic
conditions in developing countries favorable to terrorism has been championed
by a wide range of commentators.52
A counter-terrorism strategy that strikes at the financial funding of
terrorism, however, has gained more traction recently as an immediate response
46. Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism, June 3, 2002, Clementine Olivier, Human
Rights Law and the International Fight Against Terrorism: How do Security Council Resolutions Impact on
States' Obligations Under International Human Rights Law? USAG/RES. 1840 (XXXII-0/02) (June 3,2002).
47. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
48. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 25, 2001).
49. Militant Islamists, for example, have openly advocated the creation of a pan-Islamic state across
South and Southeast Asia. In multinational response to this, see Shawn Donnan, Bali Hosts Terrorism Debate
while Indonesia Shies Away from Confronting Suspects, FIN. TIMES (Asia ed.), Feb. 4, 2004 at 2.
50. Michel Henri Bouchet, The Impact of Geopolitical Turmoil on Country Risk and Global
Investment Strategy, in TERRORISM AND THE INT'L BUS. ENv.: THE SEC.-Bus. NEXUS, 92-94 (GabrielleG.S.
Suder, ed., 2004).
51. See President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2006).
52. Compare John Norton Moore, Solving the WarPuzzle, 97 AM.J. INT'LL. 282,288 (2003), with
Christopher Preble, Free Trade: a Potent Weapon Against Terror, AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 20, 2003 (giving a
libertarian perspective) and Daniel T. Griswold, Free Trade Tills the Soil ofDemocracy, DETROIT NEWS, July
30, 2003, and Jeffery D. Sachs, Democrats ShouldBack Free Trade, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2001 (giving a
neoconservative perspective).
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to terrorism. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an inter-governmental
body that attempts to police against money laundering and terrorist financing,
has advocated methods to improve information exchange between countries on
terrorist funding.53 The U.S. has also more aggressively taken official action
to pursue the financing of terrorism.54 However, the desire to locate and disrupt
sources of ,financing for terrorists, although -attracting more salience and
attention today, has been a counter-terrorism strategy for at least several
decades now." Indeed, countries have, since decades ago, engaged in trade and
economic sanctions against nations which have had governments suspected of
sponsoring terrorism.
2. Traditional Whole-Nation Sanctions
At least until very recently, financial disruption of terrorism networks has
almost exclusively meant penalizing government sponsors of terrorism, usually
by targeting whole nations with trade or foreign investment restrictions.
Famous examples of sanctions levied against an entire nation for suspected
terrorism links by the government are the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA)" and the Export Administration Act (EAA)." Both U.S.
statutes give the President broad powers to impose trade sanctions against
hostile nations. The IEEA has been used against South Africa in the 1980s,
Iraq in the 1990s, Haiti, Burma, Sudan, Serbia, Montenegro, and the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia.5" The U.S. also leveled sanctions against Iran during
the hostage crisis, the Soviet Union after its invasion of Afghanistan, and
Poland after martial law was declared there for a time.59 It can be said that
some of the aforementioned sanctions were motivated more by human rights
concerns rather than terrorism or national security concerns, while other
sanctions were probably motivated by a mixture of both. The relatively
53. E.g., Fin. Action Task Force, Forty Recommendations on Money Laundering, (June 20, 2003),
available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org (follow the "40 Recs" hyperlink) [hereinafter FATF]. See also FATF,
Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing, (Oct. 22, 2004) available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org
(follow "9 Special Recs" hyperlink). Andrew Parker, Move to Boost Crackdown on Terrorist Finance, FIN.
TIMES (Asia ed.), Feb. 28/29, 2004, at 5 (providing an account of the geopolitical climate surrounding
FATF's actions).
54. See supra note 48.
55. LORET'A NAPOLEONI, MODERN JIHAD: TRACING THE DOLLARS BEHIND THE TERROR
NETWORKS, 22 (2003) (describing the economic trade policies the United States pursued during the Cold
War, particularly in response to Marxist guerilla fighters/terrorists in El Salvador).
56. 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (2004).
57. 50 U.S.C. § 2401 (2004).
58. Sarah H. Cleveland, Human Rights Sanctions and International Trade: A Theory of
Compatibility, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 133, 143-44 (2002).
59. Id.
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recently passed Clean Diamond Trade Act,"° which initially faced opposition
from President George W. Bush on the grounds that the Act allegedly violates
GATT, mixes a concern for human rights conditions in Africa with a desire
to end militarization in certain African countries like Sierra Leone and
Liberia.62 It has been suggested that many of the diamonds affected by the
Clean Diamond Trade Act are used to funnel funds to the terrorist organization
al-Qaeda.63
Regardless of whether sanctions are imposed largely because of explicit
national security concerns, human rights concerns, or a blurring of both-which
may increasingly be the case as gross violations of human rights are becoming
understood as threats to international peace and securityT -the traditional
model of imposing sanctions, as illustrated by the examples above, is to use
sanctions to penalize an entire nation for the alleged crimes or abuse of its
government. Almost all international disputes between national governments
follow this traditional approach of using whole-nation sanctions. Indeed, it is
difficult to imagine another common approach to resolve international disputes,
other than the resort to military action. Illustrative of the prevalent usage of
sanctions, it is impossible to even conceive of United States foreign policy
without the existence of whole-nation sanctions.65
3. Diplomacy, Politics, and Institutions
A political justification of why whole-nation sanctions are conventional
and normative is that most global agreements concerning trade, security, and
human rights have government signatories, not private entities or individuals
as signatories. Thus, governments are parties in disputes in all but a handful of
cases where private individuals are directly allowed to bring their complaints.66
60. 19 U.S.C.S. § 3901 (2004).
61. Cleveland, supra note 58, at 134.
62. Questions surrounding the legality of the Act under the GAT framework were waived by the
WTO. See WTO General Council, ProposedAgenda, Item 6, WT/GC/W498 (May 13, 2003).
63. See Timothy W. Docking, Terrorism's Africa Link, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Nov. 14,
2001 at 9. See U.S. Sen. Patrick Leahy, Address on the Senate Floor (Apr. 9, 2003), available at
http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/200304/ 040903e.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2006).
64. Hoe Lim, Trade and Human Rights: What's at Issue?, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 275, 286-87
(2001). The conceptual blurring of national security and human rights has strongly influenced the foreign
policy of President Bush's administration, see Guy Dinmore, 'Fear Societies' the Target of New
Administration, FIN. TIMES. (Asia ed.), Jan. 21, 2005, at 2.
65. Raj Bhala, MRS. WA TU: Seven Steps to Trade Sanctions Analysis, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 565,
566-67 (1999).
66. Private individuals may bring a cause of action under the WTO Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement. Private investors may bring complaints against foreign
governments through the International Centre for Settlement of International Disputes (ICSID) depending on
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The GATT is no exception to this general rule. The GATT exclusively treats
member states as parties to the GATT framework, which means only member
states may participate in WTO panel and Appellate Body proceedings. This
feature has opened the WTO GATT dispute settlement process to criticism
from those who feel that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) ought to play
a larger role in dispute settlement by being able to file amicus briefs in panel
and Appellate Body hearings.67 The WTO was formed exclusively by states,
however, and it is precisely from the formal entry into the WTO by 149 states6"
that gives the WTO a certain image of legitimacy. Moreover, if states enter the
WTO, naturally states have an interest in maintaining control over hearings.
Furthermore, it may be difficult to overstate the simple institutional inertia that
exists in the WTO dispute settlement structure, which would make the
introduction of non-state parties in the process rather unlikely for the near
future.69
Another reason why the WTO remains exclusively a dispute settlement
body between member states is that this makes communication and settlement
easier for nations. Member states are more likely to be aware of one another's
needs or areas of compromise, whereas private parties may be quite unpredict-
able as to what they are expecting or would accept for compensation. Predict-
ability is arguably a rather significant benefit for national security related trade
sanctions, which often touch on sensitive topics such as political fear,
nationalism, and genuine concerns over safety. Undoubtedly, with the high
political stakes involved in an Article XXI sanction, predictability is a very
valuable asset for a diplomatic solution. Should private parties be able to bring
complaints challenging the legitimacy of an Article XXI sanction, however, the
private parties stand a greater chance to act incalculably.
It also bears noting that national security related sanctions are not
infrequently coordinated or planned with other nations. As in the African
conflict diamond regulation and the sanctions in Iraq through the 1990s, many
parts of the world join in sanctions where there exists a shared threat or a
shared symbol of a threat. The U.N. can at times serve as a guide to encourage
the relationship with the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals
of Other States. See WTO, Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex C
(Apr. 15, 1994).
67. See Steve Charnovitz, Opening the WTO to Nongovernmental Interests, 24 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 173 (2000); Daniel D. Bradlow, The Issues in the New Millennium: "Times are a-Changin "': Some
Preliminary Thoughts on Developing Countries, NGOs, and the Reform of the WTO, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L
L. REv. 503 (2001).
68. WTO, Homepage, What is the WTO? available at http://www.wto.org (follow "The WTO"
hyperlink; then follow "What is the WTO?" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 28, 2006).
69. Joseph Weiler, WTO Panel Member, Remarks at Kyushu University, Graduate School of Law
(Mar. 22, 2004).
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nations to share in the fight against terrorism by suggesting multilateral action.70
These sort of shared sanctions operate best amongst parties that know one
another. Additionally, since the goal of such sanctions is usually to pressure the
sanctioned nation to abandon dangerous weapons programs, stop human rights
abuses, or to crack down on militants and/or terrorists within national borders,
it does seem most effective to place liability, by way of sanctions, against
governments.
C. Problems with the Present Model
1. Humanitarian Concerns
Despite the long practice of nation states placing trade sanctions on one
another, there exist several shortcomings of whole-nation sanctions in the
current fight against terrorism. One objection to conventional sanctions, which
may be applicable to all whole-nation sanctions and not just Article XXI
measures, is that traditional sanctions tend to place hardship on those who are
powerless instead of putting pressure on the intended targets.7 This can lead
to severe humanitarian crises, a significant concern in its own right, but also a
contributing problem in the spread of terrorist ideology. Whole-nation
sanctions have the powerful ability to disrupt the economic development of the
target country, thereby crippling a number of economic opportunities for people
in the target country. This in turn may breed an environment of dissatisfaction
and hostility, fodder for ideological extremism and terrorism.72 Thus, the long-
term harmful effects on innocent populations-a virtual inevitability from
whole-nation sanctions-need to be seriously weighed in order to avoid
disastrous unintended consequences of not only the humanitarian kind but of
the national security kind as well.
2. Internationalization and Global Regionalism of Terrorism
There are other significant shortcomings in continuing to understand
GATT Article XXI within a nation-to-nation paradigm. The changing nature
of terrorism may be antiquating the current dispute settlement process. State-
sponsored terrorism has been steadily declining since the early 1990s. It has
70. E.g., 2002/35 Human Rights and Terrorism, The Commission on Human Rights, April 22,
2002.
71. Don Henshaw, Sanctions: Another Weapon of War, CAMBRIDGE REP., Apr. 25, 2003, at A6
(illustrating that sanctions against Iraq did little to destabilize the regime of Saddam Hussein, but reportedly
led to severe starvation and malnourishment of hundreds of thousands of people in Iraq).
72. Kevin J. Fandl, Terrorism, Development & Trade: Winning the War on Terror Without the
War, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 587, 602-03 (2004).
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been replaced with terrorism conducted by independent groups, usually very
ideologically driven by violent religious extremism or nationalism. 3 Indeed,
in the U.S. State Department's current list of Designated Foreign Terrorist
Organizations, a list of thirty-seven organizations, and Other Terrorist Groups,
a list of an additional forty groups, there is not a single organization that is
directly or officially state-sponsored." Although the list does include several
groups that have varying degrees of informal support from government leaders,
e.g., Hezbollah has received funding and aid from Iran,75 the majority of the
listed organizations operate more or less independently from any government
73. WALTER LAQUEUR, THENEWTERRORISM: FANATICISM AND THE ARMS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
178-83 (1999).
74. The Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations are: Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), Abu
SayyafGroup (ASG), AI-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, Ansar al-Islam (AI), Armed Islamic Group (GIA), Asbat al-
Ansar, Aum Shinrikyo (Aleph), Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), Communist Party of the
Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA), AI-Gama'a al-slamiyya (Islamic Group, IG), HAMAS (Islamic
Resistance Movement), Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM), Hizballah (Party of God), Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM), Jemaah Islamiya (Jl), AI-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad, ELI),
Kahane Chai (Kach), Kongra-Gel (KGK, formerly Kurdistan Workers' Party, PKK, KADEK), Lashkar-e-
Tayyiba (LT), Lashkar i Jhangivi (LJ), Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Mujahedin-e Khalq
Organization (MEK or MOK), National Liberation Army (ELN - Colombia), Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PU),
Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Palestinian Front
for the Liberation Front of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), A-Qaida, Real IRA (RIRA),
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Revolutionary Nuclei, Revolutionary Organization 17
November, Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) 135, Salafi st Group for Call and
Combat (GSPC), Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path or SL), and United Self-Defense Forces/Group of
Colombia (AUC). 2003 DEP'T ST. PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM REP. app. B (released April 29, 2004),
available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/31711 .htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2005). The Other
Terrorist Groups are: AI-Badhr Mujahedin (al-Badhr), Al-Ittihad al-Islami (A1AI), Alex Boncayao Brigade
(ABB), Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR), Anti-Imperialist Territorial Nuclei (NTA), Cambodian
Freedom Fighters (CFF), Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)/United People's Front, Continuity Irish
Republican Army (CIRA), Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), First of October Antifascist
Resistance Group (GRAPO), Great East Islamic Raiders-Front (IBDA-C), Harakat ul-Jihad-l-Islami (HUJ1),
Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B), Hizb-I Islami Guldbuddin (HIG), Hizbul-Mujahedin (HM),
Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), Irish Republican Army (IRA), Islamic Army of Aden (IAA), Islamic
International Peacekeeping Brigade (IIPB), Jamiat ul-Mujahedin (JUM), Japanese Red Army (JRA),
Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), Lord's Resistance Army
(LRA), Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF), Maoist Communist Center of India (MCCI), Moroccan Islamic
Combatant Group (GICM), New Red Brigades/Communist Combatant Party (BR/PCC), People Against
Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD), Peoples War, Red Hand Defenders (RHD), Revolutionary Proletarian
Initiative Nuclei (NIPR), Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs
(RSRSBCM), Sipah-I-SahabaiPakistan (SSP), Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR), The Tunisian
Combatant Group (TCG), Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), Turkish Hizballah, Ulster
Defense Association/Ulster Freedom Fighters (USA/UFF), and Ulster Defense Force (UVP). 2003 DEP'T ST.
PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM REP. app. C (released April 29, 2004), available at
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2003/31759.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2006).
75. PATrERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM app. B, supra note 74.
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authority or agenda, except where a terrorist organization's agenda and a
government's agenda happen to be congruent. Even amongst the organizations
that may have originated with formal state sponsorship, such as the PFLP in
1967 from the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), these organizations
are notorious for splitting in factions, as the PFLP-GC did in 1968 from the
PFLP,76 and thus tend to be unreliable to the formal state organs for carrying
out state political goals under the leadership of state strategy. The extent of
autonomy of non-state terrorist organizations is reflected in their ability to
engage in state-like "plausible deniability" as well as hold diplomatic relations
with formal states.77
The weakening of state-sponsored terrorism is illustrated by the lack of
terrorist activity of once highly involved countries such as Cuba, which at one
point supported nearly all Latin American extremist movements and left-wing
terrorism, and North Korea, responsible for a number of massive bombings
against South Koreans in the 1980s. 78 Libya also has recently shown uneasi-
ness in sponsoring terrorism. In the 1970s and 1980s one of the foremost
sponsors of international terrorism--Colonel Khadafi even promoted his little
"Green Book" as inspirational literature for terrorism-today Libya has
jettisoned its pro-terrorism rhetoric and has even begun to cooperate with the
West in revealing valuable information about its weapons programs.79
What has replaced the state-sponsored terrorism, however, is far more
dangerous, at least within the security and sanction framework that exists today.
Names of organizations like al-Qaeda have now entered the common Western
vocabulary, and Osama bin-Laden is possibly the world's most infamous
person. Neither al-Qaeda nor bin-Laden, though, are really associated with any
particular nation state; both are perceived by the West as nationally amorphous,
which makes it all the more difficult for observers to fully grasp what kind of
terrorist force threatens the world today.
One of the most difficult characteristics about non-state terrorism is the
evasiveness of the perpetrators. Unlike nation states, international terrorist
organizations typically do not control quantifiable territory complete with a
capital city. Rather, the terrorists, even the leaders of terrorist organizations,
move stealthily, always on the run. It is a bit like guerilla warfare, just more
transnational. This kind of mystery fighting, where not even the identity of the
76. Id.
77. NAT'L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL MAPPING THE GLOBAL FUTURE: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL'S 2020 PROJECT 94-5 (Dec. 2004), available at
http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_globaltrend2020_s4.html#trans (last visited Nov. 18, 2006).
78. LAQUEUR, supra note 73, at 180-81.
79. Rob Watson, U.S. Displays 'Libyan Nuclear Secrets', BBC NEWS, Mar. 16, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3514818.stm (last visited Nov. 18, 2006).
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terrorist leaders are known with certainty, disappointed Pakistani forces who
thought they were on to one of al-Qaeda's top officers near the border of
Afghanistan in March 2004, but ended up finding tunnels instead which were
probably used for al-Qaeda's escape."0 Among the al-Qaeda fighters left
behind, a mix of nationalities was discovered, including Uzbeks, Chechens,
Afghans, Arabs, and western Chinese Uighurs.8 The multi-national and multi-
ethnic dimension of non-state terrorism, as a result of either an ideological
appeal that spans across national borders, like pan-Arabism, or a universal
appeal, such as an absolutist faith in a militant and expansionist Islam, can be
much more dangerous than state-sponsored terrorism due to the vaster reach of
territory with a terrorist presence and the deeper pool of potential recruits.8 2
The Taliban in Afghanistan, for example, recruited "j ihadists" from all over the
world. 3 In Indonesia today there exists terrorist training camps operated by
local Islamic militants that serve the wider al-Qaeda network that attract
hundreds of foreigners from Europe, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Middle
East. 4 Monitoring non-state terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda's
expansive network, is rather difficult because of the lack of fixed capitals and
fixed borders.
Pakistan has already been mentioned, but one may note that countries as
far apart and different as Indonesia, Yemen, and possibly Thailand have
experienced difficulties with al-Qaeda activities within their borders.8 5 This
true internationalization of terrorism has become an undeniably characteristic
feature of the modern world. Indeed, current trends suggest that non-state
actors, including terrorist organizations, will continue to assume a more
prominent role in global affairs.8 6 It is for this reason that the traditional
approach of comprehending the world exclusively in terms of nation states is
outdated, and perhaps dangerously so. Consequently, employing trade sanctions
to fit within neat political boundaries in order to pressure parts of the world to
comply with the international community may be irreconcilable with reality.
80. David Rohde & Carlotta Gall, Tunnels Found in Pakistan Tied to Foreign Militants, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 22, 2004.
81. David Rohde & Carlotta Gall, Seeking Top Qaeda Figure, Pakistanis Battle Militants, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 20, 2004.
82. LAQUEUR, supra note 73, at 238.
83. Id. at 239.
84. Donald Pearson, Radical Islam in Indonesia and lts Potential Impact on International Islamic
Terrorism, 8, no.2 J. COUNTERTERRORISM & SEC. INT'L 16, 17 (2002).
85. See Jemaah Islamiyah Document Reveals Planned Bombings in Indonesia, STRAITS TIMES,
Apr. 1, 2005; Mark Huband, Yemeni Police Arrest Second Top al-Qaeda Terror Suspect, FIN. TIMES (Asia
ed.), Mar. 5, 2004, at 7; Amy Kazrnin, Muslim Militants Blamedfor Thai Blasts, FIN. TIMES (Asia ed.), Feb.
11, 2005, at 9.
86. Nat'l Intelligence Council, supra note 77.
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The very manner in which terrorist groups operate today-spread thin over vast
territory, located in numerous countries-makes whole-nation sanctions an
inadequate weapon; akin to "trying to kill a mosquito with a wrecking ball."87
Indeed, there exists evidence that al-Qaeda deliberately accelerated the
decentralization of its organization to counteract and stay ahead of U.N.
sanctions placed on it and Afghanistan, thus allowing al-Qaeda to stay
financially able of carrying out its objectives.88
Imposing whole-nation sanctions on states that sponsor terrorism may be
justified because sanctioned governments might actually be significantly
weakened if the national economies falter from a sharp reduction in trade. The
rationale for whole-state sanctions against governments that sponsor terrorism
cannot be used, however, for non-governmental terrorist organizations. A
faltering domestic economy most likely does not affect independent terrorist
organizations in the same way sudden economic collapse can undermine the
legitimacy of a government.89 Moreover, the vast majority of the terrorist
organizations on the U.S. State Department's list receive independent sources
of funding separate from where the majority of their activities take place; this
is particularly true for the terrorist groups that focus their terrorist activities in
and near Israel, such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the PFLP-GC.9° Naturally, a
very spread-out organization that truly is multi-national and has an independent-
ly wealthy leader, such as al-Qaeda, is not nearly as vulnerable to sanctions
imposed on individual nations as the targeted nations themselves. Consequent-
ly, there appears to be a strong correlation between self-reliance of a terrorist
group and the level of impact whole-nation sanctions will have on the group.9
3. Financing of Terrorism
Whole-nation sanctions are perhaps their weakest in addressing the
financing of non-state terrorism. Unlike state-sponsored terrorism which for its
funding relies heavily on domestic tax revenue, which in turn is dependent on
the state of the economy, non-state terrorism tends to operate financially in the
margins of economic activity, or perhaps even completely outside the
87. Alan Einisman, Ineffective at Its Best: Fighting Terrorism with Economic Sanctions, 9 MINN.
J. GLOBAL TRADE 299, 320 (2000).
88. Stephen Fidler, AI-Qaeda Outsmarts Sanctions, Says UN: Decentralisation and Smaller
Operations with Less Need for Funds Frustrate Counter-Measures, FIN. TIMES (Asia ed.), Aug. 28, 2004,
at 1.
89. Einisman, supra note 87, at 300.
90. PATrERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM app. B, supra note 74.
91. Einisman, supra note 87, at 309.
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mainstream economy.9 2 Consequently, the financial support of non-state
terrorism is affected far less by whole-state sanctions than on state-sponsored
terrorism.
Increasing evidence shows the extent to which terrorist organizations,
particularly non-state organizations, receive funding through the illicit drug
trade. In January 2002, the U.S. government for the first time collected proof
that Hezbollah and terrorist groups in Yemen and Lebanon were directly
receiving proceeds from the sale of methamphetamine in Chicago, Detroit, and
other U.S. cities.93 Of course, the linkage between the illicit drug trade and
terrorist groups in Latin America has been well understood for some time by
intelligence experts and scholars. It has been known since the 1980s, for
instance, that the terrorist-sponsoring states of Cuba and Nicaragua have
supported terrorist groups with illicit drug trafficking. 94 The non-state terrorist
groups in Colombia, especially the FARC, may be considered the quintessential
narco-terrorists, it being one of the first and largest narco-terrorist organiza-
tions.95 FARC's status as a narco-terrorist organization is reflected in the lack
of division between its revolutionary interests against Colombia's government,
which it supports by terrorism, and its profiteering interests, which it supports
from the cocaine trade, assuming there exists a division. Perhaps one of
FARC's slogans is very telling: "Coca and Liberty... Long Live the Revolu-
tionary Struggle." 96
Within militant Islamic terrorism, perhaps no organization contributed to
the illicit drug trade more than the Taliban in Afghanistan. Although the
Taliban long officially forbade the consumption of opium and similar drugs for
religious reasons, and punished severely those who used drugs, the production
of opium in Afghanistan was actually encouraged. As a result, before the fall
of the Taliban, Afghanistan was one of the world's main centers of opium
production.97 Indeed, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) has suggested
that it is highly likely that Osama bin-Laden personally facilitated the heroin
trade from Afghanistan to finance terrorist activities.9"
The illicit drug trade may not appear to have much relevance for WTO
governance (after all, drug trafficking does not enjoy GATT concessions), but
92. M. CherifBassiouni, Legal Control oflnternational Terrorism: A Policy-OrientedAssessment,
43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 83, 88 (2002).
93. Don Bamard, Narco-Terrorism Realities: The Connection Between Drugs and Terror, 9, no.
I J. COUNTERTERRORISM & SEC. INT'L 31 (2003).
94. Id. at 32.
95. NAPOLEONI, supra note 55, at 39-40.
96. LAQUEUR, supra note 73, at 189.
97. Id. at 211-12.
98. Bamard, supra note 93, at 32.
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the illicit drug trade does not exist in a vacuum; it exists amongst legal trade.
The overwhelming majority of illicit drugs that are shipped to the U.S. are
co-mingled with legally imported goods.99 The innocuous kitchen ingredient
honey, for example, is a favorite export/import good as a conduit for the illegal
trafficking of drugs, arms, electronic items, etc.' 00 Due to terrorist connections
to certain sectors of the honey trade, such as Osama bin-Laden's control of
Yemeni honey companies and Islamic Jihad's use of honey shops to raise funds,
terrorist organizations receive revenue from a legal source as well as a cover for
smuggling.' ' Thus, it can be said that terrorists are using the legitimate free
market, largely governed by the WTO, to engage in the illicit drug trade in
order to fund terrorism.
Whole-nation sanctions, however, cannot address this problem very
effectively because such sanctions are too indiscriminate, affecting the vast
majority of trade in goods that are not co-mingled with illicit drugs. Not only
do such broad sanctions deter trade liberalization in legitimate goods, and thus
run counter to the objective of GATT and the WTO, but overly broad sanctions
fail to isolate and identify the precise nature and export and import routes of
illicit goods. From a law enforcement and investigative perspective, the whole-
state sanction approach should raise some questions on how effectively the
sanctions aid counter-terrorism agencies in tracing the financial sources of
terrorism. Rather than using sanction tactics that were developed to fight the
kind of terrorism that was prevalent two decades ago, counter-terrorism efforts
today must adapt to the advantages that globalization has given to the financing
of non-state terrorism.1
0 2
One of the ways in which globalization has helped the financing of
terrorism is by providing a globally expansive reach for businesses and NGOs
or non-profit groups that serve as fronts for terrorist organizations. In the
United States, for example, President George W. Bush soon after September
11 th announced the closure of three entities in the U.S. that had ties with
Hamas: the Holy Land Foundation, Beit-al Mal Bank, and Al Aqsa Islamic
Bank. 03 The Holy Land Foundation, purportedly a charity, raised $13 million
99. Id. at 33.
100. NAPOLEONI, supra note 55, at 158-59.
101. Id.
102. Willy Deridder, Executive Director of Interpol, Remarks at the 16th Annual Interpol Symposium
on Terrorism (Oct. 22-23, 2001) (transc ript available at
http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/speeches/20011022b.asp) (last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
103. Press Release, United States Department of Treasury, Remarks by John B. Taylor, Under
Secretary of the Treasury on the Financial Fight Against Terror (Dec. 4, 2001), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/po840.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2006).
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for Hamas in one year. 1" Beit el-Mal Bank and Al Aqsa Islamic Bank engaged
in directing business and in investing $25 million for Hamas.' 5 Indeed, the
United States' post-September 11 th actions to more closely monitor financial
information for terrorism links highlights the potential significant role that faux
businesses and NGOs play in funding terrorism.'0 6 Stricter scrutiny on charit-
able funding since the September 11 th attacks resulted in U.S. officials freezing
over $130 million in terrorist assets, with approximately $75 million of the total
suspected of having belonged to al-Qaeda or the Taliban in 2003.'07 In Canada,
the government's anti-money laundering efforts have uncovered $35 million in
suspected terrorist financing; $22 million was uncovered in the 2002-2003
fiscal year.0 8 The periodic freezing of assets of individual groups worth
millions of dollars, however, does not even begin to address the overall global
network of terrorist financing, which has been estimated to be worth $1.5
trillion.'0 9
The free market financial characteristic of non-state terrorism is a natural
by-product of market globalization." 0 NGOs like the Holy Land Foundation
possibly benefit the most from globalization because NGOs, as a result of
globalization, have risen in prominence and numbers in recent years, demand-
ing for a greater role in the development of international norms and law."'
Within this growth, terrorist organizations have planted NGOs for the purposes
of spreading propaganda for terrorist objectives, receiving official recognition
from governments and international organizations, like the United Nations, for
their humanitarian efforts, recruiting activists for terrorism, and collecting
donations." 2 Globalization has particularly increased the exploitive advantages
that charities and faux charities can receive from official recognition from the
United Nations, which provides an aura of legitimacy, thereby making it easier
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See generally Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
107. Douglas Farah, Al Qaeda 's Finances Ample, Say Probers; Worldwide Failure to Enforce
Sanctions Cited, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2003, at Al.
108. Jim Bronskill, $35MFunneledto Terror Groups; Amount exceeds 2002-03 Agency 29 cases
probed thisfiscal year, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 29, 2004, at A 16.
109. Napoleoni compares this figure as being twice the GNP of the United Kingdom and three times
the size of the United States money supply; thus appropriately terming terrorist financing as the New
Economy of Terror. NAPOLEONI supra note 55, at 198.
110. Id.
111. Stephan Hobe, The Era of Globalization as a Challenge to International Law, 40 DUQ. L. REV.
655, 659-60 (2002).
112. Donald Pearson, Tracking Terrorists Through Open Sources, 6, no. 1, J. COUNTERTERRORISM
& SEC. INT'L 58 (1999).
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for these organizations to solicit funds from international donors." 3 Interna-
tional donors may play a critical role because the organizations themselves are
typically located in areas of an impoverished population. The growing threat
of terrorist front organizations passing off as legitimate NGOs is indeed listed
as one of the nine modem terrorism-related dangers issued by the international
FATF.' 1
4
The recent seizures of terrorist funding reflect a concerted and more
cooperative effort between governments and international agencies in pursuing
terrorist financing.' 15 Nonetheless, the practice of freezing assets suspected of
funding terrorism and relying on governments from varying economic and
social conditions to police and make bank records transparent is a daunting task
that may not be sufficient in blocking the financing of terrorism." 6 Indeed, the
FATF has identified sanctions as a critical step in reducing terrorist funding
and, consequently, the threat ofterrorism. 7 Therefore, it may behoove nations
to increase the usage of trade sanctions in their arsenal of methods to combat
terrorist financing, but by employing trade sanctions designed to adapt to the
non-state nature of terrorist organizations today. Sanctions ought to mitigate
as much as possible the negative economic consequences inflicted on innocent
populations. This caution should be taken for humanitarian reasons as well as
to avoid causing social conditions friendly to terrorist ideology.
The traditional model of whole-state sanctions is inadequate to handle the
modem threat to international stability from non-state terrorism. Although
possibly effective for state-sponsored terrorism, whole-state sanctions address
neither the transnational character of modem terrorism, nor of terrorism's
increasing integration in the globalized economy from which it finds interna-
tional financing. Since many terrorist organizations today are not conveniently
113. Id.
114. See Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing, supra note 53, at no. 8.
115. U.N. SC Res. 1373 (2001) and the FATF's Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing
are the main sources of law and guidelines for international cooperation in combating terrorist financing.
SUPPRESSING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM: A HANDBOOK FOR LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING (Paul Gleason &
Glenn Gottselig eds., 2003). To help coordinate international efforts to combat terrorist financing, the Egmont
Group brings together financial intelligence units from 101 countries to share information. To facilitate U.S.
efforts, the U.S. Treasury Department recently created an office designated specifically to coordinate the
investigation ofterrorist financing with other financial crimes. Press Release, U.S. Dep't ofthe Treasury, U.S.
Treasury Department Announces New Executive Office for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes (Mar.
3, 2003).
116. See Jean-Marc Sorel, Some Questions About the Definition of Terrorism andthe Fight Against
Its Financing, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 365 (2003).
117. The FATF has given increased importance to the policing of economic activity for money that
may fund terrorism. See Cherry Reynard, FATF Expands Its Role on with New Standards, INT'L MONEY
MARKETING, Nov. 6, 2001, at 1.
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located or funded within neat political borders, but rather exist as shadowy
entities spanning across nations and even continents, it must logically follow
that trade sanctions imposed on nations put very little pressure on these non-
state terrorist organizations. Indeed, one may even conclude that the disruption
in trade liberalization from whole-state sanctions is no longer a proportional
sacrifice for what little, if any, security returns such whole-state sanctions
produce in the attempt to combat non-state terrorism. Consequently, GATT
Article XXI must not be read in a manner that limits the security exception to
only whole-state sanctions. Regardless of what may have been the original
intent and early practice of Article XXI, to continue to read it in the traditional
light endangers the world from the threat of international non-state terrorism,
a realistic and material threat to the modern, globalized world.
I. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO APPLYING TRADE SANCTIONS
A. Regional Trade Sanctions in Response to Non-State Terrorism
1. The Application of Regional Sanctions
An alternative means of imposing trade sanctions without the
disadvantages of whole-nation sanctions is to make sanctions more precise and
better focused. Region-specific sanctions to counter terrorism would cease to
define sanctions in the terms of nation states, but would rather conceptualize
sanctions as a means to punish and control the wealth of particular terrorist
organizations without regard to national boundaries.
Trade sanctions of this sort would not necessarily be bound on an entire
nation, but could be imposed just on a particular region within a nation-
perhaps imposed on a sub-national level of government-that is suspected of
harboring terrorists or exporting goods to fund terrorism. Such a sanction
would leave the rest of the nation unaffected in international trade. Using
Thailand as an example, certain provinces suspected of harboring terrorist
activities"' could have sanctions imposed, but the rest of Thailand would be
free to trade. Although sub-national, region-specific sanctions could easily be
transnational if the sanctioned areas cross national borders. A place where this
may be desirable in order to counteract porous borders, a well organized
terrorist network, and a related drug trade operating freely across national
borders is the area where Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina all intersect." 9
Imposing trade sanctions just on the region where the three countries' borders
118. Kazmin, supra note 85.
119. Timothy L. O'Brien, South American Area is Cited as Haven of Terrorist Training, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 2003, at A28.
[Vol. 13:1
Lobsinger
touch in order to put pressure on the movement of trade goods in the area would
allow the remaining areas of the three countries free to engage in normal trade
relations.
Regional sanctions, at least in effect, already have been utilized by the
E.U. against the U.S. In the E.U.'s threatened countermeasures against U.S.
steel import limits, the E.U. threatened to place sanctions on very particular
types of goods, which all seemed to be important exports for certain U.S.
states. 2 ' Curiously, these U.S. states were important "swing states" for the
2004 U.S. general election. Of course there are differences between E.U.
countermeasures against targeted goods and regional sanctions used to mitigate
terrorism. Whereas E.U. countermeasures may be designed to affect certain
influential localities in order to place pressure on the national government,
regional sanctions would primarily exist to directly challenge terrorist
strongholds without any intention of undermining the national government.
Far from attempting to undermine or place pressure on a national govern-
ment, regional sanctions could essentially ignore national governments and
apply pressure directly to terrorist-dominated regions (assuming the national
government is distinct from the terrorist organizations). Unlike conventional
sanctions, regional sanctions could bypass the national government of a nation
altogether; enabling the imposition of sanctions, an inherently international
measure, but lacking the government-to-government interaction, a traditional
facet of international actions. Perhaps this bypassing of national governments
coincides with the growing clout of international non-governmental entities,
such as NGOs, multilateral companies, international agencies, and even
independent, transnational terrorist groups, all at the expense of the power of
national governments.1 2' The implication behind avoiding national govern-
ments in imposing sanctions is not that it is a call for a change in how to shape
foreign policy, but rather an acknowledgment of how globalization has shifted
the focus away from states to non-state actors.
120. Adrian Cox & Emily Schwartz, EU Tariff Revenge Could Get Personal; Would Target Goods
from States Crucial Politically to Bush, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 24, 2002, at 58.
121. Maryann Cusimano Love, Globalization, Ethics, and the War on Terrorism, 16 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 65, 66-67 (2002). The author makes this observation on globalization and the
diminishing importance of nation states, especially concerning terrorism: "On September 11th, nonstate
actors used non-military means to attack primarily noncombatant and non-government targets. The al Qaeda
terrorist network, the presumed perpetrators, operate across sovereign borders with cells in an estimated fifly
states. The suicide bombers, nineteen hijackers representing no state, were Saudis and Egyptians living in
the United States, trained in Afghanistan, organized and financed in Germany, England, and Spain, with
information and money sent internationally to them from companies, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), and individuals. Al Qaeda's financial network drew from diamond trade in Sierra Leone and the
Afghan heroin trade, linking the terrorist network with global crimes and drug trafficking networks."
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Key characteristics of regional sanctions are that they could narrowly limit
the areas under sanction as much as possible and geographically pinpoint a
terrorist region with the hope of restricting the movement of trade goods in that
area. Regional sanctions would radically change the perception of how anti-
terrorism sanctions ought to be conceptualized in an age where national borders
are losing their significance not just with terrorism but with all matters of global
economic and political issues. From a legally formalistic point of view, the
suggestion of ignoring national boundaries in imposing trade sanctions may
seem rather bold. After all, the very foundation of the WTO presumes states
to be actors in nearly all decisions'2 2 and for the rules of trade to be in accor-
dance with GATT. Indeed, recourse against sanctions perceived in violation of
GATT is only given to member states of the WTO, thus providing states
exclusively the right to challenge trade sanctions.'23
2. Flexibility of Article XXI
The most relevant provision in GATT for trade sanctions imposed to
combat terrorism is the national security exception, Article XXI. Regional
trade sanctions as suggested in this Paper have not yet been enacted under the
provisions of Article XXI. Article XXI has only been invoked so far when
targets of the sanctions have been nation states, which is not surprising given
the presumptions of the GATT/WTO framework. The plain language of Article
XXI, however, does not seem to preclude member states from imposing
sanctions on specified regions within the borders of other member states.
Article XXI uses rather broad and permissive language, in contrast with the
more restrictive chapeau of Article XX. 24 The history of the usage of Article
XXI does not shed much light as to whether a new, targeted approach to
sanctions would be permissible, except that Article XXI sanctions may be
justified for potential as well as actual dangers. 125 Moreover, ambiguity on
what Article XXI permits partly stems from the fact that a WTO panel has not
yet had the opportunity to review an Article XXI case. The broad language of
Article XXI and the lack of definitive decisions concerning the Article have led
122. For exceptions, see supra note 66.
123. Only WTO member states may petition for a WTO panel to review another member state's
sanctions to decide the validity of the sanctions under GATT. Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 2, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round (1994), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legale/28-dsu.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2006) [hereinafter DSU].
124. See GAT art. 21, supra text accompanying note 14.
125. See Summary Record, supra note 23.
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scholars to disagree about some arguably more fundamental questions on the
proper scope of the Article. 26
Considering the room for varying opinions on the usage of Article XXI
sanctions, it may be reasonable to conclude that in the interests of fighting
terrorism, regional trade sanctions imposed on the sub-national level against a
WTO member state are well within the real possibilities for employing Article
XXI. Of course, this line of analysis maintains its relevance only if the WTO
has a right to review and make decisions on Article XXI sanctions. 27 For
purposes of examining more clearly the legal flexibility of Article XXI,
naturally it must be assumed that the WTO does possess the authority to review
Article XXI sanctions. 28
3. Sanctions and the Diamond Trade
In 2003, the WTO granted sanctions that in some respects appear targeted
at the sub-national level by authorizing trade restrictions imposed on WTO
members not participating in the Kimberley Certification Scheme, a procedure
that attempts to deter the sale of "conflict diamonds.' ' 129 By issuing certifica-
tion for diamonds that are mined with certain minimum standards, Kimberly
Certification essentially enforces a source of origin scheme in which the
particular mine the diamond is from is the relevant factor, with the objective of
preventing as much as possible the sale of diamonds that fund militias and even
terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda. 13  The WTO-authorized waiver for
accommodation of the Kimberley Certification Scheme is not, strictly speaking,
however, a kind of regional sanction that is suggested by this Paper, since the
WTO waiver authorizes sanctions on diamonds by Kimberley participants (that
are member states) imposed on states that are not Kimberley participants. The
WTO waiver, nonetheless, requires that trade in diamonds between Kimberley
participants must be limited to non-conflict diamonds; this in effect threatens
126. See generally supra note 40.
127. The academic debate on whether an Article XXI sanction is reviewable by a WTO panel has
produced a number of differing views. Id.
128. Should the WTO at some point actually decide that it has no authority to review Article XXI
sanctions, naturally any further speculation on the legal limits of Article XXI, including this Paper's
examination of targeted sanctions, would be moot, since Article XXI would then essentially serve as a
limitless exception for VTO member states--giving member states essentially the position of Rex nonpotest
peccare as long as Article XXI were invoked. See generally GATT, supra note 5, at art. 21
129. See WTO General Council, Proposed Agenda, Item VI WT/GC/W/498 (May 13, 2003); WTO
Council for Trade in Goods, Waiver Concerning the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough
Diamonds: Communication, G/C/W/432/Rev.I (Feb. 24, 2003); WTO Council for Trade in Goods,
Kimberley Process Certification Schemefor Rough Diamonds- Requestfor a Waiver, G/C/W/431 (Nov. 12,
2002) (including a reprint of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme).
130. See Docking and U.S. Sen. Leahy, supra note 63.
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sanctions if a Kimberley participant imports diamonds from particular diamond
mines rather than particular diamond producing countries. In this sense, the
WTO waiver for the Kimberley Certification Scheme polices trade between a
nation and a sub-national level of another nation, i.e. particular diamonds
mines.
Even though the WTO has opted to respect the Kimberley Certification
Scheme by creating a special waiver, it is not altogether clear that a special
waiver was necessary. Sanctions to conform to Kimberley could have been
justified under Article XXI.'3 1 Article XXI(c) would have excused sanctions
because the United Nations initiated Kimberley and the U.N. General Assembly
as well as the U.N. Security Council have supported the scheme.'32 Sanctions
would also have fallen within Article XXI(b)(ii) and Article XXI(b)(iii)
because the conflict diamonds relate directly to the traffic in weapons and the
funding ties to al-Qaeda are of profound concern for national security interests
of many WTO member states.'33
This applicability of Article XXI for sanctions under the Kimberley
Scheme illustrates an example in which sanctions may be utilized to address
national security concerns that primarily exist at the sub-national level of other
countries. The WTO waiver system for Kimberley does not impose sanctions
directly on sub-national regions, but it does impose diamond sanctions on
countries that trade with uncertified mines. This is just one step removed from
direct sanctions on such mines. Thus, it is not entirely without related prece-
dent to suggest that Article XXI sanctions could be imposed on sub-national
regions.
B. Advantages of Regional Sanctions
1. Effective Against Non-State Terrorism
By identifying a precise area for sanctions, regional sanctions can more
effectively isolate and publicly identify a base of terrorist operations and
financing than conventional sanctions that restrict trade for an entire nation.
Prohibitions on the trade of goods from a particular area within a country may
help prevent terrorists from co-mingling their exports with legitimate exports
in that country in the attempt to hide the exports used to finance terrorism. The
co-mingling of terrorism financing exports-often narcotics-with legitimate
131. See Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Compassion or Superiority Complex?: What to Make of the WTO
Waiver for "Conflict Diamonds ", 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1177 (2003).
132. Id. at 1185.
133. Id. at 1185-86.
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goods is the means in which a majority of narcotics are shipped to the U.S. 34
Indeed, the illegal drug trade is a major source of terrorism funding, used for
funding by a wide array of terrorist organizations, including the IRA, the
Kurdistan Workers Party or PPK, Kosovo Liberation Army, Hezbollah, Hamas,
Abu Sayef, al-Qaeda, Tamil Tigers, the United Wa Army, ETA, FARC, ELN,
and Shining Path. 35 As previously mentioned, although the trade in narcotics
is not a WTO issue per se since the GATT does not provide trade protection for
narcotics, the fact that illegal drugs are often trafficked by being co-mingled
with legitimate goods does make the shipment of narcotics an issue that touches
upon the security of legitimate, WTO-protected trade.
Terrorist organizations also engage in what on the surface appears to be
legitimate businesses. Not only does al-Qaeda, for example, use honey and
baked goods businesses as fronts for fundraising,'36 Osama bin-Laden himself
has been tied to various construction companies, currency trading firms, and
export-import businesses. 37 Indeed, the business network of terrorist organiza-
tions is truly multinational. 38 Al-Qaeda and other radical Islamic groups are
suspected of receiving funding from Al Taqwa, a group of companies in
Switzerland, Liechtenstein, the Bahamas, and Italy, with shares of business
throughout Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Al Taqwa has cement plants,
drydocks, textile and brick factories, a division that trades factories, and a
division that trades steel, wheat, oil, and other commodities.'39 The business
networks that fund al-Qaeda and similar terrorist groups certainly rely on
globalized trade facilitated by the WTO. Thus, the sanctions available in the
WTO regime, amongst them notably Article XXI, have the ability to minimize
the terrorist funding.
Effective Article XXI sanctions, however, ought to target only the areas
with terrorist ties and not entire nations, because targeted sanctions have the
potential to isolate terrorist havens from not only the rest of the world, but also
from within the countries the terrorist havens are located. Particularly in
geographically larger WTO member states, such as the E.U., China, and India,
where terrorist financial activity might occur in a small area of the member's
borders, regional sanctions imposed over only the relevant region might isolate
134. See Barnard, supra note 93, at 33.
135. Id. at 32.
136. Bruce Zagaris, The Merging of the Counter- Terrorism and Anti-Money Laundering Regimes,
34 LAw & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 45,52 (2002) (naming AI-Hamati Sweets Bakeries, AI-Nur Honey Press Shops,
and AI-Shifa Honey Press as three businesses tied to aI-Qaeda funding); Napoleoni, supra note 55, at 158-59.
137. Zagaris, supra note 136.
138. Id. at 70.
139. Id.
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terrorists more completely by deterring those outside of the sanctioned area
from co-mingling their exports with goods originating in the sanctioned region.
The U.S. imposed regional sanctions within Afghanistan in 1999 by
enacting a comprehensive embargo on "goods, software, technology (including
technical data), or services" to the Taliban and "to the territory of Afghanistan
controlled by the Taliban."' 4 ° In practice, this meant that the majority of
Afghanistan was under sanction that prohibited trade and financial exchange
between Americans and Afghans since the Taliban controlled a majority of
Afghanistan. Nonetheless, the trade sanction against Taliban controlled
territory may serve as a model as to how regional sanctions can disassociate
sub-national regions from national political boundaries, and thus focus more of
the world's attention on the terrorists themselves. Indeed, shortly after the U.S.
imposed sanctions on the Taliban, the U.N. Security Council adopted sanctions
against the Taliban and even demanded that the Taliban hand over Osama bin-
Laden. 14' Future use of regional sanctions could likewise bring public attention
to terrorist organizations and perhaps help mobilize multilateral efforts to
isolate terrorist havens from funding.
Regional sanctions could be particularly useful in preventing money
transfers in the form of illegal hawala banking, a form of banking and money
transfers prevalent in Southeast Asia and many Muslim nations and known for
its paperless trail and informal arrangements. 42  Hawala operates by the
transferor of money asking a hawaladar to transfer a specified sum to the
transferee, who may be in another country.'43 The hawaladar gets in touch with
his contact, another hawaladar, near the transferee.' 44 The hawaladar near the
transferee gives the specified sum to the transferee. At some later point, the
hawaladars exchange goods to balance the account.'45 This is a method in
which money can be transferred without currency ever having to cross national
borders. The system also lacks written records since personal contacts are
relied on and hawaladars operate trusting one another. Because of the lack of
140. Himamauli Das, The United States Sanctions Response to the Attacks of September 11, 2001:
A Synopsis of Remarks at the NESL Rogue Regimes Conference, 36 NEW ENG. L. REv. 943,950 (2002). The
sanction against the Taliban controlled areas of Afghanistan was Executive Order 13129, Exec. Order No.
13,129, 64 Fed. Reg. 36,759 (July 7, 1999).
141. Das, supra note 140, at 951-52. The U.N. Security Council actions against the Taliban are:
S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999); S.C. Res. 1333, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19,
2000).
142. Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., Organized Crime, Terrorism, and Money Laundering in the Americas,
15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 3, 13-15 (2002).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. (Baldwin adds that the hawala system is like a "Western Union without the high tech gear
and exorbitant transfer fees").
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records in hawala and its reliance on personal knowledge and trust, it is an
incredibly difficult system for investigators to crack, even when investigators
know where it exists, such as in the "hawala triangle" of Dubai, Pakistan, and
India. 4 6
Regional trade sanctions could disrupt areas known to engage in terrorist-
related, cross-border hawala money transfers by simply prohibiting the trade
in goods from those areas, thus removing a means of transferring money
between hawaladars.'47 Regional sanctions definitely would not eliminate
altogether the transfer of funds to terrorists by hawala, but regional sanctions
may make using trade in goods a difficult substitute for the transfer of more
easily traceable cash.'48 Moreover, imposing regional sanctions in order to
combat unsavory uses of hawala would bring greater public awareness of this
still relatively unknown practice, which could place more scrutiny on suspected
terrorism-related hawala dealings.'49
2. Effective for International Relations
Regional trade sanctions may perhaps be most beneficial in how they
could improve trade relations between countries and provide more courses of
action for times when sanctions are desirable. The decision to impose trade
sanctions is usually controversial with many points of view, not least because
conventional trade sanctions-sanctions imposed on an entire country-
adversely affect various third parties, 5 ' although sanctions are viewed as the
more humane and less politically controversial alternative to the heavy
bluntness of armed military conflict for resolving international disputes.' 5 ' If
sanctions are levied against an entire developing country, however, the impact
on the people in the country who do not have any role in why the sanctions
146. Id., at 15-17.
147. Baldwin, supra note 142.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. For the controversy over the Helms-Burton Act on third parties see, e.g., Schloemann and
Ohlhoff, supra note 2 1; for the effect sanctions against Iraq had on that country's civilian population, see
Henshaw, supra note 71.
151. See JOHN F. MURPHY, STATE SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (Westview Press, Inc.
& Mansell Publishing Ltd 1989); Kenneth W. Abbott, Economic Sanctions and International Terrorism, 20
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 289, 303 (1987). It has been suggested that economic and trade sanctions may
address the root causes of terrorism far more effectively than military intervention. See, e.g., Sean D.
Murphy, International Law, the United States, and the Non-Military 'War' Against Terrorism, 14 Eur. J.
INT'L L. 347 (2003). The United Nations Security Council has long used sanctions instead of military
intervention in response to terrorism. See, e.g., sanctions imposed on Libya for failing to surrender two
Libyan nationals suspected of bombing Pan Am Flight 104, S.C. Res. 748, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (Mar. 31,
1992) and S.C. Res. 883, U.N. Doc. S/RES/883 (Nov. 11. 1993).
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were imposed in the first place may disproportionately suffer, such as how the
sanctions against Haiti actually enriched the Haitian government because the
government profited off of the contraband economy at the expense of the mass
populace."' Sanctions resulting in mass poverty lead to humanitarian crises
and possible fertile breeding ground for ideological and religious extremist
terrorism, whereas economic growth and a rise in population-wide prosperity
are powerful factors that diminish the appeal of ideological terrorism.
5 3
Indeed, an expansion of free trade-the very opposite of trade sanctions-in
order to encourage economic growth in developing countries is a policy advo-
cated to counteract the conditions that foster terrorism.'54
Regional sanctions provide a way to hinder the economic activity of
terrorist organizations while also mitigating as much as possible the unintended
consequences of impoverishing a large portion of a nation's population. By
confining the area imposed with sanctions, regional sanctions are ethically more
justifiable for not causing nation-wide humanitarian crises. Regional sanctions
are also strategically smarter by not contributing to conditions friendly to the
breeding of terrorist ideology.
Regional sanctions, unfortunately, still may impose harsh economic condi-
tions on innocent populations who live near terrorist base camps. Considering
the close proximity such populations are to terrorist ideology and propaganda,
it is not unreasonable to conclude that, suffering from sanctions, such people
may be more disposed to assist terrorist organizations, thus aggrandizing the
problem of terrorism. Regional sanctions, however, at least limit imposed
economic hardship as much as possible, and consequently limit the pool of
potential people who may feel more inclined to ally with terrorists in response
to the effects of sanctions. Additionally, sanctions may not influence the
allegiance of those who happen to live near a terrorist base of operations and
who consequently feel oppressed by the local terrorist group. For example, the
terrorist organizations in Colombia, FARC, AUC, and ELN, are known for
brutally terrorizing those who live under their rule.'55 Also, the Shining Path
of Peru is known for its inhumane actions against locals.'56 Regional sanctions
152. Cann, supra note 10, at 466.
153. Fandl, supra note 72, at 609 (emphasizing that "Eradicating poverty is the single most potent
solution to the problem of terrorism.").
154. See Robert B. Zoellick, Countering Terror With Trade, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2001, at A35;
Brink Lindsey, The Trade Front: Combating Terrorism with Open Markets, TRADE POLY'S ANALYSIS no.
24 (Aug. 5, 2003).
155. See, e.g., Julia E. Sweig, What Kind of War for Colombia?, FOREIGN AFF. Sept.-Oct. 2002, at
122.
156. See Ravi Nair, Confronting the Violence Committed by Armed Opposition Groups, 1 YALE
HUM. RTs. & DEV. L.J. 1 (1998) (assessing the difficulties in countering human rights violations committed
by non-governmental armed groups against the populations that the groups are based in).
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have the possibility of breaking local population dependencies on the "terror
economy," which may be beneficial for such local populations in the long term
as such populations reintegrate with the mainstream economy, even if short
term consequences might be economically painful.157
By only focusing on regions hiding terrorist organizations and attempting
not to impose harsh economic conditions on populations in other areas, regional
sanctions may appear less hostile on the whole than an entire nation being
sanctioned. Additionally, regional sanctions might dispel many of the
suspicions that governments often possess when sanctions are imposed on them
in the name of national security, especially since national security has not been
a well-defined concept, and arguably an elastic concept. Indeed, developing
nations tend to view Article XXI sanctions as nothing more than political acts
expressive of a wealthier country's foreign policy and economic interests, with
little regard for real national security concerns.' Regional sanctions would
encourage a greater degree of transparency because regional sanctions are by
their nature more geographically precise, consequently leaving less room for
speculation as to ulterior motives for the imposition of sanctions. Reducing
cynicism for Article XXI sanctions ought to be a high priority for Western
nations since trust between the West and the developing world is critical in the
fight against terrorism, which is evident by the increased multilateral efforts to
confront terrorism, as represented by recent counter-terrorism activities by such
diverse regional organizations as the ASEAN, 5 9 the OAS, 60 the APEC,' 6' and
the E.U.
162
Unfortunately, the developing world has observed in the past what has
appeared to be hypocrisy in the application of purported national security trade
sanctions. For instance, the U.S. imposed sanctions on India and Pakistan after
both countries detonated nuclear tests, but agriculture and food were exempted
from the sanctions in order to satisfy important constituencies in the U.S.1
63
Also, the U.S. has given inconsistent treatment between China, which was
given Normal Trade Relations status,"6 and Cuba, which has been subjected to
157. Napoleoni, supra note 55, at 109-10 (presenting the harsh suffering of local populations that
become dependent on a "terror economy" imposed by locally dominant non-state terrorist organizations).
158. Cann, supra note 10, at 419-20.
159. ASEAN, supra note 45.
160. See supra note 46.
161. See supra note 42.
162. Fuller, supra note 44.
163. Cann, supra note 10, at 451.
164. Normal Trade Relations for the People's Republic of China, Pub. L. No. 106-286, 114 Stat.
880 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C. & 22 U.S.C.) (authorizing the President of the
United States to approve China's entry into the WTO).
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harsh trade and investment sanctions under the rationale that Cuba is a security
threat and human rights violator.'65 Cuba may very well be a gross violator of
human rights, and the Caribbean communist country certainly has contributed
to state-sponsored terrorism in the past,'6 6 but there does appear to be double
standards in treating China vastly differently from Cuba considering China's
less-than-reputable human rights record and past support of secretive North
Korea. Because of such inconsistencies in employing national security sanc-
tions, developing countries tend to be wary of Article XXI sanctions.
167
To overcome this cynicism and win back the confidence and trust of
developing countries, it is imperative for the West to utilize Article XXI
sanctions honestly and with a clear purpose. Regional sanctions have the
advantage of conveying more clearly the rationale for the sanction. Covering
a more geographically limited area than conventional sanctions, regional
sanctions would not shut out as much trade as conventional sanctions, thus
offering fewer opportunities for a target nation to speculate that protectionism
may have been an ulterior motive in imposing sanctions.
Not only could regional sanctions reduce skepticism from developing
countries of Article XXI sanctions, but in some cases governments may
willingly cooperate with the prospect of having sanctions imposed on a region
of the country that is under the influence of terrorist organizations. Currently,
the government of Colombia cooperates with the U.S. government in fighting
against the left-wing narco-terrorist and rebel group FARC that operates in
Colombia and in fact controls significant territory within Colombia's borders.'68
Likewise, the U.S. has worked with the government of Pakistan in order to
search for al-Qaeda and Taliban encampments in the remote provinces of
Pakistan. 169 The Pakistani government, indeed, imposed economic sanctions on
its own north-west region in order to counteract non-state terrorism. 170 It is not
too inconceivable to think that governments like Colombia and Pakistan, which
suffer from certain areas being controlled by terrorist organizations, might
cooperate rather willingly to cut off trade to and from the terrorist controlled
areas. With the assistance of major trading partners imposing sanctions on the
165. For a summary of the Helms-Burton Act of 1996 imposed against Cuba, see Schloemann and
Olhoff, supra note 21, at 427-30.
166. LAQUEUR, supra note 73, at 180-81.
167. Cann, supra note 10, at 450-51.
168. Andy Webb-Vidal, FARCPoisedfor New Battle in Long War, FIN. TIMES (Asia ed.), Apr. 11,
2005, at 2; Marika Lynch, Rebels Say They 're HoldingAmericans; Colombia 's FARCAssails U.S., Demands
Prisoner Exchange, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 25, 2003, at A3.
169. David Johnston, Raid on Feb. 13 Smoothed Way in al-Qaeda Arrest, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,2003,
at Al.
170. Farhan Bokhari, Pakistan Lifts North-West Region Sanctions, FIN. TIMES (Asia ed.), Sept. 27,
2004, at 2.
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terrorist-controlled areas, it might make the attempt to financially isolate a sub-
national region far more successful than if a weak central government tried to
on its own control the trade of a province ruled by terrorists. Consequently,
regional sanctions may actually be seen by some governments that have
difficulty maintaining authority over terrorist controlled regions as a welcome
tool.
C. Possible Criticisms of Targeted Sanctions
1. Lack of Relevance and Effectiveness
In spite of the advantages that regional sanctions may offer, there exist a
number of possible objections to such a sanction scheme. One criticism might
be concerning the relevance of analyzing Article XXI. Because of the present
ambiguity of Article XXI,'71 the notion of justifying regional sanctions based
on Article XXI may be irrelevant, since many WTO member states might be
hesitant to justify trade sanctions on the wording of an unpredictable Article
XXI, especially for unorthodox regional sanctions.' 72 Unwillingness on the part
of nations to refer to Article XXI for sanctions would render the issue moot.
Nonetheless, the strength of the WTO lies in its relatively formalized structure,
at least in comparison to its far more informal predecessor GATT, which
suggests that respect for its rules-based procedure is a large part of the WTO's
appeal, as evident in its significant case load.'7 3 Thus, it is important for the
sake of formalized rules to explore the possible interpretations and applications
of GATT articles, including Article XXI.
A perceived lack of effectiveness in curbing terrorist financing may also
raise questions of relevance in analyzing regional sanctions. The Kimberley
Certification Scheme, for example, has come under criticism from some NGOs
for the Scheme's absence of "regular independent monitoring."' 74 Naturally,
regional sanctions might also be subjected to similar criticism, being measures
imposed by nation states without necessarily any input or monitoring from
independent sources. Although criticism of the Kimberley Certification
Scheme may be relevant to regional sanctions because of their similarity,
criticism on the grounds of lack of independent oversight can be applied to any
171. See generally supra note 40.
172. "Even developed countries, often on the receiving end of expansive U.S. "national security"
measures, are likely to resist contorting the language of article XXI toj ustify even "smart" sanctions measures
for fear that damaging precedent will be established." Craig Forcese, Globalizing Decency: Responsible
Engagement in an Era of Economic Integration, 5 YALE HMN. RTS. DEV. L.J. 1, 48 (2002).
173. See Bacchus, supra note 31.
174. Daniel L. Feldman, Conflict Diamonds, International Trade Regulation, and the Nature ofLaw,
24 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 835, 866 (2003).
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form of government imposed sanctions, including conventional state-to-state
sanctions. Indeed, the absence of NGOs in measuring the effectiveness of
sanctions is a fault that would be hardly unique to regional sanctions.
2. The Problem of Standing
A possible procedural issue that regional sanctions raise is the difficulty
in understanding the applicability of standing. The first question is whether a
terrorism-related sanction imposed on a sub-national area of another WTO
member state would even qualify as a proper Article XXI sanction. Article
XXI was drafted explicitly to protect the security and sovereignty of states.175
Of course it is reasonable to speculate that the drafters foresaw national security
threats from non-state origins, but it may be too much to think that anything
other than member states would be targets under Article XXI. After all, GATT
only treats member states as parties to the GATT framework, which means only
member states may participate in WTO panel and Appellate Body proceedings.
This might seem to suggest that only sanctions against another member state are
relevant for GATT exceptions, including the national security exception of
Article XXI. A regional sanctions scheme as suggested by this Paper, however,
conceptually fits into the mold of conventional sanctions against states, with
only the geographical scope of the sanction being the difference from
conventional sanctions.
From a practical point of view, it is difficult to imagine that the WTO
would refuse to hear a complaint from a member state about how it alleges it
is an unjust victim of an Article XXI sanction solely because the sanction does
not cover 100 percent of the member state's territory.176 If the WTO were to
refuse to hear a complaint based on such rationale, then a risk-averse nation
wanting to impose sanctions without having to defend the sanctions would
simply always leave a small percentage of the target nation's territory sanction-
free. This would be an absurd loophole to avoid WTO panel reviews. There-
fore, member states likely would have standing to challenge a sanction that does
not completely cover the member state's territory.
Additionally, parallels may be drawn between targeted sanctions and
limited wars or otherwise known as imperfect wars-wars conducted between
two countries but with restraint and typically with limited political goals, such
as the U.S.'s involvement in Kosovo and Serbia.177 This is not to suggest that
175. See Akande & Williams, supra note 13.
176. For the moment, please set aside other possible reasons a WTO panel may not review the
complaint, including deference to a nation imposing Article XXI. For a summary of varying opinions on this
issue, see supra note 40.
177. Michael Hahn, The Conflict in Kosovo: A Constitutional War?, 89 GEO. L.J. 2351, 2361-62
(2001).
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trade sanctions are anything like war, but only that both may be utilized in a
geographically limited fashion. Since imperfect or limited restrictions are
recognized in the conduct of warfare, certainly the more benign retaliation of
sanctions can be used in a limited or imperfect way, especially if very specific
political goals are the object, such as financially crippling terrorist organiza-
tions.
A far more difficult potential problem of regional sanctions is to determine
who has standing to bring a complaint to the WTO if a member state actually
welcomes sanctions on a certain region within its borders. Do private
individuals from the region suffering targeted sanctions have standing to bring
a complaint to the WTO if the national government supports the sanctions? For
example, assuming the Colombian government would welcome regional trade
sanctions against FARC-held territory, would private individuals in FARC-held
territories be permitted to challenge the sanctions to the WTO panel? The
WTO dispute settlement process has been criticized from those who feel that
NGOs ought to play a larger role in dispute settlement by being able to file
amicus briefs in panel and Appellate Body hearings. I"' Many member states,
however, adamantly expressed concern when the Appellate Body in the
EC-Asbestos case adopted an ad hoc procedure for the filing of amicus curiae
briefs from non-state interests, since WTO dispute resolution procedures do not
explicitly provide for the possibility for unsolicited amicus curiae briefs.179 As
a result, the Appellate Body was informed to exercise extreme caution for using
amicus curiae briefs in the future. 18 ° Institutional inertia also tends to keep out
new plans for representation of non-members at WTO panels.'
8
'
Nonetheless, the trend in the world seems to be moving towards more
individualized remedies in intergovernmental actions. Intellectual property
rights are already recognized by the WTO as a private right.8 2 Human rights
as called for in the U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
European Convention on Human Rights grant private rights.i"3 In a very limited
fashion, the U.N. Security Council permits individuals in exceptional cases to
178. See Charnovitz and Bradlow, supra note 67.
179. Complaint against EC, European Communities-Measures Affecting the Prohibition ofAsbestos
andAsbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135 (May 28, 1998); Peter Van den Bossche, The WTO Dispute
Settlement System andArab andlslamic Countries, in STRENGTHENING RELATIONS WITH ARAB AND ISLAMIC
COUNTRIES THROUGH INT'L L. 192-93 (2002).
180. Id.
181. Weiler, supra note 69.
182. Thomas Cottier, Trade and Human Rights: A Relationship to Discover, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L.
111, 120 (2002).
183. Id.
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appeal U.N. sanctions.'84 Along with this trend, one could reasonably assert
that individuals who reside in an area affected by regional sanctions and whose
national government approves of such sanctions ought to be recognized as
having standing in the WTO as a matter of equity. Otherwise, individuals in the
affected areas would have no effective remedy. Admittedly, however, this in
itself is not sufficient reason to grant such affected individuals standing-
individuals today are affected by other countries' trade regulations, but only
member states may bring complaints forward to the WTO, which essentially
leaves private individuals today at the discretion of their government. Perhaps
this question of standing is not so difficult after all, especially if it is compared
to a conventional trade regulations, e.g. anti-dumping rules, in which an
industry requests the government to reply to an alleged violation, requiring the
government to determine what course of action, if any, to take."8 5
3. National Treatment
Regional sanctions would certainly bring about a difference in treatment
within the same country between those goods that are under sanction and those
that are not. If a national government is perceived as complicit with this kind
of outside difference in treatment, it may raise questions of legality under the
GATT. Namely, would individuals residing in an area affected by regional
sanctions be able to bring a complaint alleging violation of national treatment
if the national government seems supportive of the targeted sanctions? The
underlying notion of national treatment is that foreign and domestic products
are treated equally; a fundamental principle of the GATT/WTO regime.'86
With regional sanctions, though, the difference in treatment would not be
between imported products and domestic products, but rather between domestic
products from different regions of the same home country. Moreover, national
treatment requires a member state not to treat like products-between imported
and domestic products--differently in its own territory. With regional sanc-
tions, however, the sanctioning government-the foreign government-would
be the one treating sub-national regions abroad differently. Even if the
184. See S.C. Res. 1521, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1521 (Dec. 22, 2003). The Committee established
pursuant to Res. 1521 permits individuals in exceptional cases to appeal travel sanctions as authorized by
Res. 1521. Procedures for Maintaining and Updating the List of Persons Subject to Travel Restrictions
Pursuant to Resolution 1521 (2003), Mar. 16, 2004, available at
http://www.un.orgDocs/sc/committees/Liberia3/152 Itbl.proc.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2006).
185. It cannot be overstated, however, that governments sometimes willingly serve as mere nominal
parties to WTO disputes, with non-state actors, i.e. affected domestic industries, being the real interested
parties. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Post-Doha Trade Agenda: Questions about Constituents, Competence, and
Coherence, in THE WTO AND THE DOHA ROUND: THE CHANGING FACE OF WORLD TRADE 79 (2003).
186. GATT, supra note 5, art. 3.
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subjected area's national government were to consent to regional sanctions, this
could only be regarded as a passive form of acceptance rather than official
measures of enactment, such as regulations, laws, or taxes that intend to treat
like products differently.
An analysis of possible objections to regional sanctions suggest that there
may be little problem in employing regional sanctions. Questions like standing
for non-member states are controversial, however, and will have to evolve
between those who wish to keep the WTO dispute resolution process in the
hands of states and those who wish to expand it. This Paper will not come to
a conclusion on that question, which is a very large topic in and of itself.
Regardless of the position one adopts, though, regional sanctions might still be
permitted because even in conventional sanctions governments have the right
to choose whether or not to challenge the sanctions, and choose not to do so
over the requests of private entities within the government's territory.
Likewise, national treatment probably ought not to be an issue in deciding
the legality of regional sanctions. Because imported products and domestic like
products would not be treated differently by the nation receiving sanctions, it
would not be a case of national treatment as understood in the traditional sense.
Consequently, after assessing possible criticisms of regional sanctions using the
same lines of analysis for judging the legitimacy of conventional sanctions,
regional sanctions still appear to be a plausible option within the GATT/WTO
framework.
IV. CONCLUSION
Questions about regional sanctions are not mere academic inquiries into
the theoretical limits of Article XXI, but rather reflect an acknowledgment that
trade sanctions may increasingly need alternative models in order to adapt to
a new age of international, non-state sponsored terrorism. Terrorist organiza-
tions, like many other organizations, have become globalized, shedding their
nation-state identities. The conventional method of imposing sanctions on an
entire nation, consequently, may be ineffective in counteracting non-state
threats. Sanctions, if they are to be used-arguably instrumental in disrupting
funds for terrorism and more benign than military intervention--ought to reflect
the changing nature of terrorism. Just as terrorist organizations have increasing-
ly not allowed formal national boundaries to define their scope of activities,
neither should sanctions.
Furthermore, an inquiry into the possible forms of Article XXI sanctions
ought to be raised in order to ensure compliance with the WTO framework. It
may be tempting for a nation that does impose regional sanctions on another
WTO member state to deny the applicability of Article XXI, should the target
nation question the legitimacy of the sanction to the WTO. This Paper, though,
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attempts to present the view that regional sanctions are indeed covered under
Article XXI and are permitted under Article XXI. Thus, assuming the WTO
panel has the authority to review Article XXI sanctions, regional sanctions in
the name of national security ought to be reviewable by the WTO.
The applicability of the GATT articles is a critical issue for examining
possible criticisms of regional sanctions, such as perceived problems with
standing and perceived problems of national treatment. Regional sanctions
most likely can survive such critiques, however. Overall, regional sanctions
should not have any more difficulties in overcoming these questions than
conventional sanctions.
Regional sanctions offer a pragmatic and possibly more humanitarian
method of imposing trade sanctions. Also, regional sanctions attempt to find
the balance between expanding free trade for increased prosperity, a tool for
fighting off the influences of terrorist ideology, and placing pressure on the
financial resources of terrorist organizations. For these extraordinarily
important policy reasons, regional sanctions ought to be seriously considered
as a legitimate alternative within the WTO/GATT framework.
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